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The theological significance of the state in the thought of  
Paul Tillich and Arnold van Ruler 
This article looks at the importance of the state in the theologies 
of Paul Tillich and Arnold van Ruler. The state is the community 
in which both the individual and the community are actualised. It 
is also the institution that organises the life of the nation. The 
orientation of the state has a direct impact on the direction of 
human life. The state is the centre of power and justice in 
reality; it is the political core of history. The state also has the 
power to actualise itself according to the justice that it posits 
and in this process love is embedded as the ultimate criterion of 
justice. Love, power and justice are intimately related to the 
kingdom of God. The state, even the pagan state, thus 
performs the reuniting and saving work of God on earth. 
Opsomming 
Die teologiese belangrikheid van die staat in die denke van  
Paul Tillich en Arnold van Ruler 
Hierdie artikel behandel die belangrikheid van die staat in die 
teologie van Paul Tillich en Arnold van Ruler. Die staat is die 
gemeenskap waarin die individu en die gemeenskap verwerklik 
word; dit is ook die instelling wat die lewe van die volk 
                                                          
1 This article is based on a thesis supervised by Prof. P.F. Theron (University of 
Stellenbosch); see Hodnett (2002). 
2 Stellenbosch Universiteit Sistematiese Teologie- en Etiek Navorsingsgenootskap. 
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organiseer. Die visie van die staat het ’n direkte uitwerking op 
die rigting van menslike lewe. Die staat is die kern van gesag 
en geregtigheid in die gemeenskap; dit is die politieke kern van 
geskiedenis. Die staat het ook die mag om himself te 
aktualiseer in ooreenstemming met sy geregtigheid. Liefde is 
die grondbeginsel van geregtigheid wat die staat moet beoefen. 
Daar is ’n intieme verhouding tussen die koninkryk van God en 
liefde, mag en geregtigheid. Die staat, ook die heidenstaat, 
doen dus die heilswerk van God op aarde.  
1. Introduction 
The significance of the state should be traced back to the Bible 
itself. Contrary to widespread popular belief, the Bible is not a book 
that concerns itself only with the fate of mankind in an afterlife and 
with conditions set to human life and behaviour that may ensure that 
this fate will be one of eternal bliss and not one of eternal torture. 
The main objective of the Bible is a completely earthly, this-worldly 
one and the social ideal stands at its centre (Engelbrecht, 1984:1). 
Van Ruler (1956:19;) writes: “Dies ist das einzige, um das es in der 
Bibel geht: die Einrichtung der menschlichen Gesellschaft nach den 
Grundlinien der Gerechtigkeit und der Liebe.” This point of view 
implies that the state should be valued as positive and good. 
Certainly, the Christian tradition has not been unambiguous on this 
point. The state has been given many different valuations – as the 
kingdom of Satan, as a negative good that merely restrains sin, as a 
natural good that is to be distinguished from the supernatural, and 
as a positive good. Also the Reformed-Calvinistic tradition has 
always been intensely interested in the state. Ford Lewis Battles 
(1986:xxv) stresses: “At the heart of Calvin’s thought was the 
relation between the King and the King of Kings, between the 
providential rule of our Heavenly Father and the sometimes 
capricious and cruel rule of him who should be the father of his 
country.” Two modern Reformed theologians that have followed, and 
built on, Calvin’s emphasis on the importance of the state and his 
emphasis on the essential relationship between God and the state, 
are Paul Tillich and Arnold van Ruler. Both of them unambiguously 
say that the state is a positive good because it is called to actualise 
the kingdom of God on earth. Van Ruler (1973:81) asks: “What is 
the kingdom of God, in Christian terms, other than the social ideal?” 
Tillich also defines the kingdom of God in terms of political and 
social justice, and writes: “If the prophetic message is true, there is 
nothing ‘beyond religious socialism’” (Tillich, 1982:13; cf. 1976:358). 
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Van Ruler is well known for his ideas concerning theocracy and 
Tillich for his “theology of culture” or theonomy. The state plays an 
important role in both Van Ruler’s theocracy and Tillich’s theonomy. 
It is my opinion that there is a material identity between the theology 
of these two thinkers in their understanding of the state. This 
identity, or at least, similarity has been briefly indicated by 
Engelbrecht (1978:37-38; 1986:125-131; cf. 1989:39). It is especially 
enlightening to consider the meaning of the state in the light of the 
theology of these two thinkers: not only because there is a material 
identity between their thought, but also because there is a very 
significant formal difference.3 
2. The significance of the state 
Tillich (1971:99) defines the state as “the power of a community that 
realizes itself in the positing of justice” and Van Ruler (1945:184) 
writes that [t]he national community only exists in so far as it is 
structured around a central power of government authority4. These 
brief definitions will provide the starting point for the discussion of 
the theological significance of the state. 
2.1 The state as community and institution 
The above-mentioned definitions imply that on the one hand, the 
state is the community in which both the personality and the 
community are actualised. Certainly the term state is much younger 
than the state-like organizations of large families, clans, tribes, cities 
and nations, in which man actualises himself, but the communal 
element remains central. Man actualises himself as a person in the 
encounter with other persons within a community. The process of 
self-integration under the dimension of spirit actualises both the 
personality and the community (Tillich, 1976:308-309). “The self-
integration of the person as person occurs in a community, within 
which the continuous mutual encounter of centred self with centred 
self is possible and actual” (Tillich, 1976:40; cf. 27, 38-41; 1966:168-
171). Van Ruler (1956:21-22; cf. 1972b:211) expresses this by 
                                                          
3 See Hodnett (2002) for a discussion of the material identity and formal 
differences between their theologies. The formal difference is the mode of 
expression used: Van Ruler relies on traditional theological language, while Tillich 
utilises language derived from existential philosophy. This article concentrates on 
the similarities and not on the differences. 
4 “Volk is daar, waar overheidsgezag word uitgeoefend ... [De kern van het volk] 
word beter getroffen door het heele begrip van volk zich te laten kristalliseeren 
rondom de gezagskern. Volk is dan geordend leven” (Van Ruler, 1945:184). 
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saying: “Der einzelne Mensch hat sein Menschsein außerhalb seiner 
selbst, in der Gemeinschaft.” He also previously stated: “De mensch 
is mensch – in gemeenschap” (Van Ruler, 1945:171). 
Thus we need to look at the structure of the community in the 
thought of Tillich and Van Ruler. The individual only exists in the 
context of community. Community, however, cannot simply be 
understood as a collection of individuals. There are institutional 
aspects. Certainly, communities are communities of individuals. 
They are not entities alongside or above the individuals of whom 
they are constituted; they are products of the social functions of 
these individuals. The social function produces a structure which 
gains a partial independence from the individuals, but this 
independence does not produce a new reality, with a centre of 
willing and acting. It is not “the community” that wills and acts; it is 
individuals in their social quality and through their representatives 
who make communal actions possible by making centredness 
possible. Tillich (1971:117) formulates it thus: “Neither a nation nor 
any other social group has a personal centre. Therefore both this 
power of being and this moral responsibility have another character 
than that of an individual person. There is a combination of natural 
and personal elements.” In a community there are not only human 
beings but also other realities. In any community there are particular 
institutions and organisations in which and by which human life is 
lived, e.g. in marriage, Sunday as a day of rest and worship, the 
school, the trade union, the press and the law. These concrete 
realities or institutions play every bit as significant a role as people in 
a community (Van Ruler, 1969:23; 1945:184-185). “One could also 
say that it is concrete things that create community. This is always 
the case. What unites individuals? Always a concrete reality (“ding”): 
a goal to be attained, a meal, a flag, a national anthem or the song 
of a particular association, a football, etc.” (Van Ruler, s.a (2):146).5  
These institutional aspects are a form of organisation that direct 
social being, and they include blood relations, language, memories, 
customs, history, heritage, tradition, and precedent (Tillich, 1976: 
309; Van Ruler, 1945:184-185; 1969:23). These all claim authority 
and structure community. But the state is the final collection of these 
                                                          
5 He also uses the example of the church community to explain the category of 
community. The church is not simply a collection of individuals, it is a communion 
with Christ (or, with God) and this communion is given form by the sacramental 
elements and sacramental practices. These elements and practices are “things”, 
“institutions” and are essential in the church community (Van Ruler, 1969:23; cf. 
1945:25). 
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institutional realities in human existence. The state is the institution 
that organises the life of the nation. The orientation of the state has 
a direct impact on the direction of human life. This view does not 
imply that the state has some kind of comprehensive sovereignty 
over all life, but only that all issues concerning culture and 
community inevitably lead us to issues about the state, and the state 
occupies the final and central position on these matters (Van Ruler, 
1969:24). The community informed by the power of justice needs a 
real and concrete concentration of power in order to manifest itself 
as such. Although the state is not identical with this concentration of 
power it becomes a reality only through it. This concentration is 
identical to the powers that support the structure of the community 
(Tillich, 1971:108-109). This point of departure allows Tillich and 
Van Ruler to understand the state as the central institute of power, 
although it is not the only structure of power. It implies that the state 
has a centredness in a political sense – that is, the possibility of 
acting with one will, even if this will is forced by the ruling powers 
upon the majority of the members of the nation against their own will 
(Tillich, 1971:117-118). “The political realm is always predominant 
because it is constitutive of historical existence. Within this frame, 
social, economic, cultural, and religious developments have an 
equal right to consideration” (Tillich, 1976:311). Reality is organised 
structurally, it is not egalitarian and structureless. Even in the most 
extreme democracies, the state is borne by special groups. Their 
power is concentrated in special offices. States are “characterized 
by their ability to act in a centred way. They must have a centred 
power which is able to keep the individuals who belong to it united 
and which is able to preserve its power in the encounter with similar 
power groups” (Tillich, 1971:109; cf. 1976:308). Van Ruler (1947a:9; 
cf.1956:24) notes: “Culture finds its kernel in the political structuring 
of life.” This does not mean that all culture and the entire life of the 
community is political. Even when the greatest possible space is 
allowed for the arts, the social-economical and the moral-spiritual 
life, it becomes apparent that the final decisions regarding these 
areas are made in the constitution, in the manner in which the 
community (state as organism) is structured, ordered and formed. 
The state is essentially a community. Community essentially in-
cludes individuals and institutions. The state is the central institute 
that structures the community. There are therefore two aspects of 
the state: community and central institute. Tillich speaks of the 
“concrete concentration of power” (institute) and the “community” 
that is structured by this concrete concentration, which together form 
the state. Van Ruler refers to the central institute as government 
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(overheid)6 or as state – this is “de harde kern van de politiek” 
(1947a:165) and he refers to the community as “nation” (volk) or as 
the “state as organism”.  
Thus the state is both the central institute and the community (of 
individuals and other institutes), and the unity of both. These two 
aspects cannot be separated. This viewpoint leads us to our next 
topic: the essential relation between the state as institute (overheid) 
and the state as community (volk). 
2.2 The vocational consciousness of the state 
According to Tillich and Van Ruler the state is the centre of power 
and justice in reality. It is the political core of history. Tillich (1971:99; 
cf. 1976:308) stresses that a state must have a centred power that is 
able to structure the community. Where there is no intrinsic power 
there is no state. Where there is no power to posit and to enforce 
justice there is no state. “In the development of the state, the power 
of a community obtains form, and thereby existence. The state is the 
power of a community that realizes itself in the positing of justice” 
(Tillich, 1971:99).7 Thus the state is essentially characterised by 
power (Van Ruler, 1945:181). This characteristic should be under-
stood in the context of the unity of power and love.  
The power of the state is the power it uses to actualise itself. It is 
being, actualising itself over against the threat of non-being. 
Therefore power is love. This nuance in the understanding of the 
state can be understood if we follow this line of argument: The 
power of being is its possibility to affirm itself against the non-being 
within it and against it. It is the power to conquer separation and to 
establish itself as a higher and more powerful unity. It is the power of 
reuniting the separated. The power of being is the greater the more 
non-being is taken into its self-affirmation. But this process in which 
the separated is reunited is love. The more reuniting love there is, 
the more conquered non-being there is, the more power of being 
there is. Therefore, we can say that love is the foundation, not the 
negation of power (Tillich, 1960:47-49; 1976:309; Van Ruler, 1945: 
181; 1978:180). Love is the urge for the reunion of the separated. 
                                                          
6 In this context the connotation of overheid is ’the central power of authority’. In 
modern political philosophy government usually refers to the (technical) 
structures and procedures of the administrative bodies. 
7 For the formal definition of this concept it is of no importance whether the bearer 
of justice is the patriarchal family, the tribe or a nation inhabiting a portion of the 
earth (Tillich, 1971:99; 1976:309). 
G. Hodnett 
In die Skriflig 38(1) 2004:63-84 69 
And wherever power supports such reunion, power performs the 
work of love. But how do Tillich and Van Ruler see this love as 
effective in the state?  
Love is seen as the directing and uniting force of a state. In every 
power structure eros relations underlie the organizational form. This 
is the love that forms the basis of the power of the state. It is the 
experience of belonging, a form of continual eros which does not 
exclude struggles for power within the supporting group but which 
unites it against other groups. Love implies the experience of 
community within the group. Every social group is a community, 
potentially and actually; and the ruling minority not only expresses 
the power and justice of being of the group, it also expresses the 
communal spirit of the group, its ideals and valuations. Every 
organism, natural as well as social, is a power of being and a bearer 
of an intrinsic claim for justice because it is based on some form of 
reuniting love. It removes as organism the separateness of some 
parts of the world. The cell of a living body, the members of a family, 
the citizens of a nation, are examples. This communal self-
affirmation, on the human level, is called the spirit of a group. The 
spirit of a group is expressed in all its utterances, in its laws and 
institutions, in its symbols and myths, in its ethical and cultural 
forms. It is normally represented by the ruling classes.  
And this very fact is perhaps the most solid foundation of their 
power. Every member of the group sees in the members of the 
ruling minority the incarnation of these ideals which he affirms 
when he affirms the group to which he belongs ... In this way, 
the power and justice of being in a social group is dependent on 
the spirit of the community, and this means on the uniting love 
which creates and sustains the community (Tillich, 1976:309; cf. 
1960:98-99). 
This “spirit of the community” is its vocational consciousness and is 
to be understood not only as the power of a group in terms of 
enforcing internal unity and external security but also as the aim 
toward which it strives which makes it a history-bearing group. 
“History runs in a horizontal direction and the groups which give it 
this direction are determined by an aim toward which they strive and 
a destiny they try to fulfil” (Tillich, 1976:310). Van Ruler (1972a:159; 
cf. 157) notes: “Every political party that is worth the name is based 
on a holy vision.” This is the vocational consciousness of the state or 
group. It may differ from group to group in character and degree of 
consciousness and in motivating power but it has been present from 
the earliest times. A very powerful expression of this is the call to 
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Abraham in which the vocational consciousness of Israel finds its 
symbolic expression. 
Vocational consciousness provides the essential structure of a state. 
This structuring power of the state is referred to by Van Ruler 
(1947a:45, 52-53) as the sacral centre of politics: “Politics always 
has a sacral centre ... And this controls the entire organism of the 
state and its influence is felt in the entire social and culturally 
structured community.” 
It must be noted that the nation (state as organism) only exists in so 
far as it structures itself around a central authority (overheid; state 
as institute). The nation is like a living organism. The idea of a 
national boundary is not particularly important in this definition. 
There is not first a basic substrate of unstructured, diffuse, 
amorphous national life that is later formed into a state. “Rather, 
there is only truly life if there is structure ... Thus the national 
community is ordered life ... [And] government power is the power to 
give structure”8 (Van Ruler, 1945:180, 185 – see footnote 5).9 Thus 
individuals do not surrender their power for the sake of the 
protection of the state. Rather, the individual only exists, as such, 
where there is already some power structuring the community. 
Therefore the state cannot be derived anthropologically or 
historically (e.g. as it is expressed in the political philosophy of 
Hobbes and Rousseau).  
Justice is the structural form of power (Tillich, 1971:99). Creation or 
life unites dynamics with form. Everything real has a form, be it an 
atom, be it the human mind. That which has no form has no being. 
Justice is a material category. It is not a social category that exists 
next to other social categories (eg. prosperity, culture, public 
worship, etc.), or a merely formal category far removed from 
ontological inquiries, but rather a category without which no ontology 
is possible (Van Ruler, 1947a:172, 173). It is the form of being, 
without which there would be no being. This is what Van Ruler  
(1947a:173) means when he says: “… in het recht is het leven” and 
what Tillich (1990:78) means when he says: “ … life without justice 
is chaos”. 
                                                          
8 “Het is zoo, dat er pas waarlijk leven is, als er ordening is ... Volk is dan geordend 
leven ... Overheid is gestelde werkelijkheid.” 
9 This essential determination of the entire structure of all things in the state does 
not imply a comprehensive determination of all things in the state. 
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In the state, the central power (overheid) structures the nation 
around its sacral centre. This means that the vocational con-
sciousness, as the political centre of the state, determines the entire 
structure and life of the state.10 The love present in the state thus 
determines the structure or justice of the state. In order to 
understand this viewpoint we must discuss the way in which Tillich 
and Van Ruler relate the ontological nature of justice to the 
vocational consciousness of the state. 
“Justice is the structure of power without which power would be 
destructive, and it is the backbone of love without which love would 
be sentimental self surrender. In both of them it is the principle of 
form and measure” (Tillich, 1971:118). There is no contradiction 
between justice and love. Justice gives form to being, to the 
dynamic of power. It is not that love does more than justice 
demands, but rather that love is the ultimate principle of justice. 
Love reunites; justice preserves what is to be united by giving it 
form. It is the form in which and through which love performs its 
work. “If life as the actuality of being is essentially the drive toward 
the reunion of the separated, it follows that the justice of being is the 
form which is adequate to this movement” (Tillich, 1960:57; cf. 71; 
1976:134-138). Love does not add something strange to justice. 
Rather it is the ground, the power and the aim of justice (Tillich, 
1959:144; Van Ruler, 1972a:42). Van Ruler (1947a:177) formulates 
it thus “in my opinion justice is the real substance of love and love is 
the structure that is built around the justice of God” (also cf. Tillich, 
1957:174)11; the love or vocational consciousness of the nation is 
thus the basis of the justice or structure of the nation. 
Justice cannot be separated from power; the power of the state 
includes justice, that is, the power of the state is its power to 
structure the community on the basis of its decisions. Furthermore, 
the state cannot abstain from determining society on the basis of 
justice. Even in taxation policies, for example, and in the 
administration of justice, the state encounters innumerable and 
profound problems relating to the structuring of the country. These 
problems cannot be resolved without some decision regarding the 
purpose or vocational consciousness of the state. 
                                                          
10 This essential determination of the entire structure of all things in the state does 
not imply a comprehensive determination of all things in the state. 
11 The relationship of justice and power to love will be further discussed in the 
section on the state as a structure of grace. 
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Theoretically and practically the state organises society out of one or 
another understanding of purpose (Van Ruler, 1973:133; 1947a:176; 
1978:132-133; Tillich, 1971:100). The point is that the power and 
justice of the state is to be understood on the basis of love (as the 
reunion of the separated) and the vocational consciousness of the 
state is the essential form of this love.  
The vocational consciousness of the state is expressed by the 
central authority (overheid) and it is this consciousness that unites 
the community (volk). The state as organism is structured around 
the state as institute. The vocational consciousness is the centre of 
power, justice and love in the nation and, as such, structures the 
nation. 
2.3 The power of the state and the kingdom of God 
We have seen that according to Tillich and Van Ruler the vocational 
consciousness of a state is its sacral centre. But as such, the state 
is not purely a piece of human culture. It partakes of the third 
dimension of the relation of man to God (Van Ruler, 1947a:164). 
There is no objective existence that is indifferent with respect to 
divine dominion. (Tillich, 1935:144; Van Ruler, 1947a:30). The 
vocational consciousness is the power of a state that gives structure 
and life to a group. This communal self-affirmation removes the 
separateness of some parts of the world. Power in its essential 
nature is the eternal possibility of resisting non-being. God and the 
kingdom of God “exercise” this power eternally. It is significant that 
the symbol in which the Bible expresses the meaning of history is 
political: “Kingdom of God” and not “Life of the Spirit” or “economic 
abundance”. “The element of centredness which characterizes the 
political realm makes it an adequate symbol for the ultimate aim of 
history” (Tillich, 1976:311, 385). Thus we can see how Tillich and 
Van Ruler understand the relationship between the centredness or 
vocational consciousness of the state and the “power” of the 
kingdom of God. 
Every victory over the disintegrating consequences of sin and guilt is 
a victory of the kingdom of God within historical existence. The 
ambiguities of power in historical existence, compulsion, force, 
objectification, etc., caused by sin and guilt are based on the 
existential split between subject and object, and this implies that its 
conquest involves a fragmentary reunion of subject and object:  
For the internal power structure of a history-bearing group, this 
means that the struggle of the Kingdom of God in history is 
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actually victorious in institutions and attitudes and conquers, 
even if only fragmentarily, that compulsion which usually goes 
with power and transforms the objects of centred control into 
mere objects (Tillich, 1976:385). 
This overcoming of the subject-object split is the manifestation of the 
kingdom of God in existence. It is the reunion of the separated, the 
reunion of essence and existence, of the kingdom of God and 
creation. Van Ruler (1947a:45) expresses this idea thus: “True 
community is only possible on the basis of the holy community that 
binds mankind together. If there is not an essentially unity, then 
there can never be a unity [in community].”  
Politics and the state are manifestations of the kingdom of God 
because they serve the self-integration of life. In this sense we can 
say that “political activity is the most religious activity of man” (Van 
Ruler, 1947a:45). 
The vocational self-interpretation of the group is responsible for the 
building of an empire; and this should be understood as an 
integrating, creative and sublimating process – as a victory of the 
kingdom of God. This emphasis can be clarified by stating that 
power as power-of-being is identical with love. Divine love is the 
urge for the reunion of the separated. It is a universal love for 
everything that exists: 
And whenever power supports such reunion, power performs 
the work of love. It does so in all small or large communities: in 
a flock of birds, in a family, in a town, in a tribe, in a nation, in 
the unity for which we are hoping – the unity of mankind and, 
above this, the universal reunion of everything that is, in its 
divine ‘Ground and Aim’, called in Christianity the kingdom of 
God (Tillich, 1971:118). 
The state manifests the kingdom of God on earth and “therefore it 
participates in the holiness of that which it helps into existence” 
(Tillich, 1971:104). Thus it is clear what it means when it is said of 
the authorities: “you are gods!” (John 10:34 ff.; Ps. 82:6). Van Ruler 
also notes that the majesty of God shines from the state, even 
though this majesty is wholly and completely concealed. We must 
speak of the divine character of the authority of the state. “The 
power of the state is not a human institution” (Van Ruler, 1945:181). 
Power is divine in its essential nature (Tillich, 1976:385; cf. 1936: 
182).  
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In the theology of Tillich and Van Ruler the basic formula of power 
and the basic formula of love are identical: Separation and reunion 
or being taking non-being into itself (Tillich, 1960:48-49). Although 
power necessarily has a compulsory element in it, this is not 
contrary to love. Luther called this the strange work of love. The 
strange work of love is to destroy what is against love. But this 
presupposes the unity of love and power. Love, in order to exercise 
its proper works of charity and forgiveness, must provide for a place 
on which this can be done, through its strange work of judging and 
punishing. In order to destroy what is against love, love must be 
united with power, and not only with power but with compulsory 
power (Tillich, 1960:49-50; 1971:119-124). Following this line of 
thought Van Ruler (1945:181; cf. 1978:180) notes: “Just as there is 
no contradiction between justice and love, so there is no contra-
diction between power, authority and force, in a word: between 
violence and love.”12 
The above-expressed thought implies that the state cannot be 
understood from the perspective of creation. It is not “the 
actualisation of a potential contained in creation” (Van Ruler, 
1945:180). God is a living God that enters history with his revelation 
and his Word. He struggles in history and sets up his kingdom. He 
acts, thus He creates history. He fulfils history. He is not the unity of 
the eternal essences. He is not the highest ideal or the deepest 
emotion. The living God is will, power and act that enters this visible 
and tangible reality and elects structures therein that He calls and 
sanctifies to his service, community and salvation. “The Kingdom of 
God is the dynamic fulfilment of the ultimate meaning of existence 
against the contradictions of existence” (Tillich, 1938:117; cf. Van 
Ruler, 1947a:26). However, one simply needs to look at history to 
see the disintegrating, destructive and profanising side of this 
process of empire-building (Tillich, 1976:340). 
These two facts must always be seen together: on the one hand that 
the political ordering of reality is the precondition for any other 
activity of a humanity that is fallen and lost in sin. All life depends on 
the fact that there is a partial actualisation of God’s justice 
(structure) in the chaos of sin. But, this actualisation of structure in 
man’s political activity does not overcome the chaos of sin, “it only 
creates an order that just manages to balance between chaos and 
                                                          
12 Of course there is a limit to this union of compulsion and love. Although there is 
no essential contradiction, compulsion can conflict with love if it purposely tries to 
prevent the aim of love, that is, the reunion of the separated. In this case force 
would then be destructive (Tillich, 1960:46, 50). 
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cosmos, as a continual narrow escape, in which humanity and 
salvation are preserved for each other” (Van Ruler, 1947a:46). A 
tension thus exists between the kingdom of God realised in history, 
and the kingdom as eschatological expectation. This is the 
difference between the kingdom of Christ and the kingdom of God. If 
this difference is not respected, the fragmentary fulfilment of the aim 
of history within history is absolutised leading to demonic 
consequences (Tillich, 1976:390-391). 
The political ordering of a state is a fragmentary and anticipatory 
victory of the kingdom of God in historical existence. These two 
elements must be emphasised and kept together: it is a victory, but 
it is fragmentary and anticipatory. It is a manifestation of the 
kingdom of Christ; and Christ rules in medio inimicorum. 
2.4 The justice of the state and the grace of God 
The power of the vocational consciousness of the state is essentially 
related to the kingdom of God. In order to properly understand this 
relation we must, however, look at why Tillich and Van Ruler see the 
justice of the state as a structure of grace. 
Noetically the cross of Christ comes first. This emphasis implies, in 
the first place, that God’s love is the reunion of the separated, not an 
ideal or a norm, but an historical reality that has been posited in 
reality by God himself in the messianic act of his self-revelation. 
“Jesus as the Christ is love, the love of God, in the sense of the love 
with which God loves us and in the sense of the love with which we 
love God” (Van Ruler, 1947a:177; cf. 1972c:51, 126). Love is the 
moving power and “the Cross of Christ is the symbol of the divine 
love, participating in the destruction into which it throws him who 
acts against love. This is the meaning of atonement” (Tillich, 1960: 
115). 
In the second place, the central aspect of this reality of God’s love in 
history is the setting up of the justice and the law of God in the 
reconciliation of the guilt of sin (Van Ruler, 1947a:177). The essence 
of our salvation lies in reconciliation and justification. Reconciliation 
is to be understood in terms of expiatio. Sin is reconciled by the 
satisfaction of the law of God. Justification is not a process in which 
the sinner is made just, but a forensic declaration, that is, a juridical 
act of God in which the sinner is accepted as justified (Van Ruler, 
1945:162; 1972a:44; Tillich, 1960:66). 
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The atoning sacrifice of Christ is a satisfaction of God’s justice, that 
is, the meaning of atonement is to be found – not in the removal of 
guilt – but in God’s justice (Van Ruler, 1956:12). According to Tillich 
(1959:144) “justification by grace is the highest form of divine 
justice”. The symbol of justification is the final expression of the unity 
of love and justice in God. It points to the unconditional validity of the 
structures of justice but at the same time to the divine act in which 
love conquers the immanent consequences of the violation of 
justice. The ontological unity of love and justice is manifest in Jesus 
as the justification of the sinner, and in relation to the sinner is called 
grace (Tillich, 1966:284-285). Therefore justice is a creative or trans-
forming reality. At this point we cannot get anywhere with the 
Aristotelian idea of proportional justice. What proportion does the 
sinner deserve, other than eternal destruction? (Tillich, 1959:144; 
1960:66; Van Ruler, 1972a:44). Because of sin, justice can only be 
understood on the basis of love as grace. The justice of God is a 
redeeming justice (Van Ruler, 1972a:43; Tillich, 1957:174). Love 
does not add something strange to justice. Rather it is the ground, 
the power and the aim of justice (Tillich, 1959:144; Van Ruler, 
1972a:42). 
Thus the state, as a manifestation of the kingdom of God, is to be 
understood on the basis of salvation and reconciliation. Van Ruler 
(1945:179-180) states it thus: “I would understand the state 
exclusively from the perspective of the regnum Christi, from the 
kingdom and reign of Christ.” This means that the state partakes in 
the mysteries of the Cross. The messianic category is that of 
reconciliation, and the actualization of God’s justice is the 
application of this reconciliation to the world. Therefore the power 
and justice of the state can only be understood on the basis of the 
cross of Christ (Van Ruler, 1978:153). 
The state is the bearer of justice, it brings order to chaos. The state 
unites and removes the separateness of some parts of the world. It 
reunites that which has been separated from God by sin and guilt. In 
this sense  
…Gemeinschaft (community) is a messianic category. [It is] the 
living unity of a group which has a common spiritual basis and a 
genuine ‘I-Thou’ relation between its members ... [it] acts in the 
direction of the messianic fulfilment; it is a messianic activity to 
which everybody is called ... [and] without ... a state, a 
community cannot exist (Tillich, 1959:198-199; cf. 1976:385).  
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Thus the state must be understood on the basis of the cross of 
Christ, on the basis of salvation and reconciliation. This requirement 
applies to the state as such. Even the pagan state partakes in the 
mysteries of the cross of Christ (Van Ruler, 1945:180; cf. p. 157; 
1947b:111-114; 1972b:124; 1978:105, 150). Life needs structure 
and the state provides this structure. Even the worst tyranny needs 
a certain amount of justice, that makes life possible (Tillich, 
1990:91). The state is the servant of God. In this sense the great 
conquerors are, as Luther visualised them, the demonic “masks” of 
God through whose drive towards universal centredness he 
performs his providential work (Tillich, 1976:340). The state partakes 
in the messiahship of Christ. Thus Cyrus, the pagan ruler, can also 
be called the anointed of the Lord (Is. 45:1). The Messiah, the 
anointed is anointed to office bearer and the office bearer is he who 
is elected and sanctified to do the work of God on earth. The work of 
God is always saving work, in which sin is undone and life is 
reunited with God (Van Ruler, 1945:180-181; 1978:153). 
The state must be understood on the basis of Jesus as the Christ. 
Tillich (1960:86; cf. 1976:225-228) explains that everything boils 
down to the justification by grace: “Nothing less than this is what has 
been called the good news in Christian preaching. And nothing less 
than this is the fulfilment of justice. For it is the only way of reuniting 
those who are estranged by guilt”. Van Ruler (1947b:535) in turn 
points out that “the last word is: love”. This emphasis implies that “all 
salvation and all true life on earth, the entire church and all history 
and culture, depend on that great burning truth of the justification of 
the sinner” (Van Ruler, 1947a:175). The power and justice of the 
state is essentially a manifestation of the love of God.13 
3. The orientation of the state and the necessity of the 
church 
Tillich and Van Ruler see no possibility of neutrality in the state’s 
application of justice to the nation. The orientation of the state 
(neutral, nihilist, materialist, racist, pagan or Christian) has a direct 
                                                          
13 This understanding is based on the description of the triune God as love, as the 
living God and the dialectic of separation and reunion, as the trinitarian 
interpretation of God as power of being (Father, power), structure of being (Son, 
Logos, justice, structure) and union of power and structure (Spirit, love). 
 The fact that the power and justice of the state is essentially a manifestation of 
the love of God prompts Cullman (1957:90) to write that “it is precisely the 
Christian who can ascribe a higher dignity to the State – even the heathen State 
– than the non-Christian citizen can do.” 
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impact on the direction of human life (Tillich, 1976:79; cf. 1976:309-
310; Van Ruler, 1945:185; 1956:24).  
Ultimately the state is faced with a choice “between either the myth 
of the blood and the spirit of humanity, or the mystery of the Blood 
and the Spirit of Jesus Christ” (Van Ruler, 1947a:57-58). Either one 
finds the spiritual foundations for the state in the Bible or one finds it 
in the individual and communal life of man himself. Nazi Germany 
found the meaning in “the blood”. Western countries, as far as they 
seek meaning, look for meaning in the spirit. But this is not different 
in principle. The spirit (with a small s) is a variation of the “blood”. 
The norms, values, ideals, tendencies and standards are variations 
of the myths of blood, race, soil, kingdom and history (Van Ruler, 
1947a:50-51). These nuances apply to any form of human ideology, 
including the deification of the greatest number or of the general 
interest (Van Ruler, 1947a:49, 62, 63; 1945:174-175; 1978:157). 
Tillich (1955:35) speaks of newspapers, radios and public opinion 
polls as the tyrants of modern democracy. 
If anything from the spirit of man establishes itself as ultimate, it 
becomes demonic, an idol. All things have the power of pointing to 
the ultimate, but when they are considered holy in themselves they 
are anti-divine. A nation that looks upon itself as holy is correct in so 
far as everything can become a vehicle of man’s ultimate concern, 
but the nation is incorrect in so far as it considers itself to be 
inherently holy (Tillich, 1966:216; Van Ruler, 1947a:50). This 
ultimate is not truly ultimate because it does not transcend relative 
interests and concerns. It tries to invest a particular loyalty with 
unconditional validity (Tillich, 1990:150). Van Ruler (1945:174) thus 
states: “The demonisation of the state consists of it understanding 
itself as part and parcel of the devine.” This is a description of a 
pagan state, as well as a description of the danger facing a 
christianised state.  
What is the solution to this problem? How can the demonisation of 
the state be avoided? Tillich (1938:133; cf. Van Ruler, 1945:174) 
answers: 
The Church ... is under obligation to bear formal witness against 
the destructive consequences of the ‘demonic’ forces of the 
present day and their heretical foundations [… ] the state 
comes to its true essence by means of the church. Revelation 
de-demonises the state. 
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4. The significance of this understanding of the state 
• The state as central institute and as community 
The state may be defined as both the central institute that 
represents the power and justice of the community, and the 
community that is structured around this central institute. The state 
is characterised by power, justice and love, centrally expressed in its 
vocational consciousness. The vocational consciousness is intimate-
ly related to the kingdom of God. Therefore the state is essentially 
the servant of God. Even the most pagan and anti-Christian state 
performs the reconciling work of God on earth.  
The state is, however, also called to be the servant of God. The 
reality and power of sin is taken seriously in this understanding. The 
state is good in its essential nature, but easily falls prey to sin by 
deifying itself or something in itself. Thus the need for the church. 
The church knows the criterion of all power and justice, i.e. Jesus as 
the Christ. The church is called to criticise the state whenever it sees 
the state exercise power that denies this criterion of love. The state 
should not dance to the tune piped by the church, but the church is 
under an obligation to witness to the truth. 
The definition offered above introduces a value judgement: the state 
exists where justice is posited. This does not mean that it is an 
idealistic definition. Sin is taken seriously (cf. Tillich, 1966:74; 
1971:63; 1976:355; Van Ruler, 1947a:129; 1947b:521). The state is 
not the “earthly God” in the Hegelian sense. Where the state exists, 
there is some form of justice. It is not correct to say that without 
justice the state would be a “gang of thieves” (Augustine). A “gang” 
implies some structure (cf. R. Niebuhr, 1954:121). It would be more 
correct to say that without justice there would only be the chaotic 
bellum omnium contra omnes, i.e. there would be no life at all. The 
realism of the definition above is not the neutral realism of 
Augustine’s definition (The City of God, 2.21; 29.24) of the state as 
“the assossiation of a multitude of rational beings united by common 
agreement on the objects of their love.” Rather, it is a positive 
realism,14 a realism that includes a value judgement: the state is an 
expression of the will of God; it is essentially the servant of God, and 
wherever there is a state there is some form of justice. Furthermore, 
                                                          
14 “Realism” denotes the disposition to take all factors in a social and political 
situation which offer resistance to established norms into account, particularly the 
factors of self-interest and power (R. Niebuhr, 1954:114). But there is no reason 
why realism should amount to a purely negative valuation of the state and not 
take the positive factors into account (cf. Engelbrecht, 1984:6). 
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it is a dialectical realism, a realism that sees justice in the state but 
demands and expects more justice – justice in accord with love. 
• The community actualised around the state is the 
realisation of salvation in this world 
The community actualised, in accordance with the demands of love, 
around the state (as institute) is the realisation of salvation in this 
world. The concern is with the community, certainly also with the 
individual, but only in so far as the individual exists within the 
community. Brunner (1949:117) quotes K. Barth with approval: “The 
State, the most impersonal because the most comprehensive of 
institutions, knows nothing of love.” This goes hand in hand with the 
idea that justice is rational, impersonal and objective. This 
essentially means that the justice contained in the vocational con-
sciousness of the state is unrelated to the kingdom of God. Brunner 
(1949:120) draws the inevitable conclusion: 
Hence the primary datum is the individual human being. That is 
the view of things entailed by the Christian belief in creation. 
The call of God goes to the individual. Only the individual can 
hear it, only the individual has a conscience, only he is, in the 
true sense of the word, a responsible person.  
This leaving of the state to itself is in fact a forwarding of demonic 
interests, because then the church has no obligation to witness to 
the state. 
• The state as viewed by Augustine and Kuyper 
Whenever the state, even the pagan state, is not understood from 
the perspective of the cross of Christ, an intolerable dualism is 
introduced into our understanding of reality. This can be clearly seen 
in the thought of Augustine and A. Kuyper. 
Augustine sees a fundamental duality between the church and the 
state – this is his famous doctrine of the two cities (The City of God, 
15.1; see Augustine, 1984). He certainly begins with a neutral 
definition of the state,15 but he also makes injustice the character-
istic of a state (19.21; 4.4). Augustine’s view of the state is 
predominantly negative (4.4; 15.1). The state can only be saved in 
so far as it is also the church (12.16; cf. Sabine, 1968:192). Engel-
brecht (1984:5; cf. 1986:44-45) writes: “In spite of Augustine’s 
intention not to yield to the temptation of introducing a fundamental 
dualism in his approach to reality, he failed to resist this temptation 
                                                          
15 See above. 
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as far as his views on the state were concerned.” H. Richard 
Niebuhr (1951:216-217; cf. R. Niebuhr, 1954:121) characterises 
Augustine’s thought on this point as an eternal parallelism of two 
eternally separate cities composed of different individuals. It may be 
possible to work out Augustine’s thought in a more positive manner 
when applied to a christianised state, but there is, in my opinion, no 
way that the dualism between the church and the pagan state can 
be overcome. 
Abraham Kuyper has attempted to work out a more positive 
doctrine of the state – particularly of the christianised state. But he 
also does not escape the dualism that has plagued Christian 
theology through the ages. He has two foundational principles: 
saving grace which is special and limited to the elect, and common 
grace which is a temporal restraining grace, which can be explained 
from the original creation and which has no link with salvation in 
Christ and therefore has nothing to do with eternal life (Kuyper, 
1998:168, 174, 193, 196). Special grace does have a purifying and 
sanctifying effect on the common grace effective in the state but this 
effect is indirect and the terrain of common grace that is effective in 
the state must be absolutely distinguished from the terrain that is 
completely governed by special grace. It is only in the church as 
organism that salvation in the sense of eternal salvation in Christ is 
effective (Kuyper, 1998:190, 195, 199-200). Thus special grace – 
and the church – stand outside and are effectively dualistically 
opposed to the state (Van Ruler, s.a. (1):18; cf. Engelbrecht, 1963: 
105-106). 
There is no dualism of salvation and creation, where Christians are 
saved from existence in the world and in the state. Rather there is a 
duality of salvation and existence, where salvation, which finds its 
root in Christ, comes to existence from the outside and finds 
expression in the heart of the believer and in the life of the state. 
God justifies the state, not because it expresses perfect justice, but 
in spite of its injustice. This is the core of the biblical gospel of the 
justification of the sinner (Engelbrecht, 1984:15). Much is demanded 
of the state and the church must bear witness to this: If the 
vocational consciousness of the state is not rooted in love, 
individuals are depersonalised and turned into standardised humans 
conditioned by radio, TV, movies, newspapers and educational 
adjustment in order to fit into the ideological process. The loss of 
personality is interdependent with the loss of community. Only 
personalities can have community, depersonalised beings have 
social relations (Tillich, 1990:65). If the vocational consciousness is 
not rooted in love the community is somehow warped, twisted, 
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deformed and misdirected. Even if the vocational consciousness is 
rooted in love the state may misuse its representative power for 
personal gain. In doing so, it destroys the justice it originally 
embodied and the basis of its own power. 
5. Conclusion 
The state is the institution that organises the life of the nation. This 
does not imply a comprehensive sovereignty over all life, but only 
the fact that all issues concerning culture and community inevitably 
lead to issues about the state, which occupies the final and central 
positions in these matters. 
The state is the political core of history and structures the historical 
and cultural life of the community according to the justice that it 
posits. This justice is ultimately to be understood on the basis of a 
love that reunites the separated. This love is also to be understood 
on the basis of the creative power of God. 
The power of the state ultimately comes from God and finds 
expression in the vocational consciousness of the state. This 
vocational consciousness determines how the state structures the 
community and therefore the state can never be neutral with regard 
to the kingdom of God. In so far as the state reunites and orders life, 
it is serving God. This also applies to a pagan state. The state thus 
performs God’s saving work on earth. However, because of sin, the 
state is separated from God and inevitably deifies itself. Thus the 
state continually needs the church to proclaim the Word of God to it 
and call it back to its proper function, as the servant of God. 
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